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Abstracts
In this paper I discuss some of  the crucial concepts of  Schelling’s Ber-
lin lectures. In particular, I show how Schelling’s discussion of  mo-
notheism grounds his interpretation of  Theogony. 
Oggetto di questo paper sono le lezioni berlinesi di Schelling e alcuni 
dei loro concetti principali. In particolare, mostro come l’analisi del 
monoteismo fonda l’interpretazione Schellingiana della Teogonia.
Objet du présent essai sont les classes enseignées par Schelling à Ber-
lin. En particulier, il montre comme l’analyse du monothéisme est la 
base de l’interprétation de la Théogonie selon Schelling.
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Philosophy of  Mythology - Philosophy of  Revelation 
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Introduction
The goal of  this paper is that of  discussing the interconnections 
between some elements of  Schelling’s Berlin lectures. In par-
ticular, I want to focus on Schelling’s reading of  monotheism 
as exposed over the course of  the first six lectures of  the series 
concerning mythology. In Schelling’s own words, monotheism 
is ‹‹the first presupposition of  the theogonical process››, and is 
‹‹posited together with human essence itself››. Moreover, this 
concept ‹‹contains the law and, as it were, the keys of  the theo-
gonical dynamic››1. By theogonical process, Schelling indicates 
humanity’s development of  increasingly deeper representations 
of  the divine across history. Since the study of  this process is the 
main theme of  Schelling’s Berlin lectures, it is possible to claim 
that the exposition of  the concept of  monotheism lays the foun-
dation of  the whole of  Schelling’s late philosophy. 
Accordingly to this understanding of  the concept of  mono-
theism as the heart of  Schelling’s  Berlin lectures, I will show 
how exactly this notion is connected to the theogonical pro-
cess. In this regard, I will analyze how the representations of  
the divine which mark the different stages of  the theogonical 
process are engendered according to the metaphysical forces 
that Schelling presents in his assessment of  divine uniqueness. 
Furthermore, I shall argue that Schelling develops a theory of  
our religious images as symbols of  the divine, namely manifes-
tations of  God as images which present and embody a transcen-
dent reality. On Schelling’s understanding of  symbols, these are 
neither given to humanity as a kind of  revelatory deposit, nor 
are they the result of  our mental projections or fancies. Instead, 
1 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Mythologie, in id., Schellings Werke, hrsg. von 
Manfred Schroter, Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munchen 1943; tr. It:  Il 
Monoteismo, a cura di Leonardo Lotito, Mursia, Milano 2002, 23. 
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Tommaso Manzon
the German philosopher provides us with a powerful middle 
position, treating religious representations as the result of  the 
cooperation between human imagination and divine creativity. 
This symbolic feature of  our religious representations is 
crucial, insofar as we come to partake of  the divine through 
them. Accordingly, as I will explain in detail below, more re-
fined religious representations do not only mark our increased 
awareness of  God’s nature. Rather, they signal a higher degree 
of  participation of  humanity in the divine life. In this respect, I 
shall argue that Schelling understands the interactions between 
God and human beings as those entertained between living be-
ings, as the mortal and the divine dimension each partakes and 
is in communion with the life of  the other. Accordingly, religious 
symbols are the products of  this living relationship, and the full-
ness with which they embody the divine gives us a measure of  
the depth of  humanity’s communion with the divine in a partic-
ular historical and social setting.
This paper will be divided into six sections. In section one 
and two I shall present Schelling’s understanding of  the concept 
of  monotheism. In this regard, I will discuss the relationship be-
tween Schelling’s exposition and its connection to what he takes 
to be the traditional dogmatic understanding of  monotheism. 
Moreover, I will show how according to Schelling the truth of  
monotheism does not prevent us from truthfully imagining God 
in a multitude of  forms. In section two, I will discuss Schelling’s 
doctrine of  the potencies and its connections to the concept of  
monotheism. This doctrine will be necessary in order to bridge 
the concept of  monotheism to the theogonical process and the 
study of  religious symbols and their development.
In section three, I will discuss Schelling’s interpretation of  
the Biblical narrative of  the Fall and its relationship to the con-
cepts exposed in sections 1 and 2. I shall also discuss how Schell-
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ing sees this event as implying a forgetfulness of  God’s nature on 
humanity’s part. This, causes the beginning of  the theogonical 
process as the long way for humanity to regain an awareness 
of  God as triune. In section four, I will go deeper in Schelling’s 
analysis of  this history of  restoration, by showing how he di-
vides it into two stages, namely that of  mythology and that of  
revealed religion. In this regard, I shall introduce the discourse 
concerning religious symbols, discussing how their development 
marks the progress of  the theogonical process, and how the dif-
ferent features characterize the symbols we find in mythology 
and those we encounter in revealed religion.
In section five and six I shall present the above mentioned 
interpretation of  religious representations as symbols. I will also 
discuss how they are connected to a metaphysics of  participa-
tion. As a conclusion, I shall explain how according to Schelling 
Christianity, as the one and only revealed religion, introduces 
religious symbols which ‹‹cannot be improved upon››, hence sig-
naling the end of  the theogonical process and the regaining by 
humanity of  its awareness of  the nature of  God as triune.
1. On The Concept of  Monotheism
In order to present Schelling’s concept of  monotheism, it is cru-
cial to observe how he addresses this notion through two dif-
ferent levels of  interpretations. According to one level, we can 
read the concept of  monotheism from a philosophical point of  
view, exploring through reason the metaphysics underlying the 
dogma received from the tradition. According to the other level, 
we can choose to understand monotheism precisely as a dog-
ma, seen in the context of  religious practices and as part of  an 
authoritative religious text. These two levels do not exclude one 
another: as Leonardo Lotito puts it, in Schelling the dogmatic 
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understanding of  monotheism is the ground for any philosoph-
ical reading of  this concept2. 
According to Schelling, dogmatic monotheism proclaims 
God to be the one true God among many false deities. On this 
level ‹‹the true, authentic God, teaches the Old Testament, is 
always just the unique, he who is unique››3. Hence, in this view 
the plurality of  false deities stands opposed to the one true God. 
In turn, if  we understand philosophically the notion of  God 
that emerges from the monotheistic dogma, we cannot but con-
clude that all representations of  God are manifestations of  the 
same reality. This, argues Schelling, follows because the concept 
itself  of  the ‹‹ capital “G” God›› already includes his oneness. 
Hence, he cannot be opposed to other deities insofar as he is not 
on the same level as them. Quoting John of  Damascus, Schell-
ing claims that God is more than just unique, but rather ‹‹over-
unique››. Subsequently, through the dogma ‹‹is not the plurality 
of  God in general to be denied, but rather the plurality of  God 
as he is in himself››4. In other words, there can be many ‹‹small 
“g” gods››, but just one true God beyond and above all of  them.
Accordingly, God’s metaphysical oneness can be represent-
ed in a plurality of  images without causing the breakdown of  his 
essential unity. Thus, we might say that Schelling thinks of  God 
as the one God above and beyond all the others as there is just 
one ‹‹matter›› for all representations of  God, including all the 
‹‹small “g” gods››5. Disregarding the number of  divine entities 
a religion portrays, they all embody the one absolute reality. To 
be sure, Christianity provides a dogmatic understanding of  God 
which by itself  is in contrast with that of  the polytheistic and 
2 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 7.
3 Ivi, 96.
4 Ivi, 52-53.
5 Ivi, 7.
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other (so Schelling calls them) mythological religions. Nonethe-
less, a correct philosophical understanding of  this dogma allows 
us to see how these different representations are united from a 
metaphysical point of  view. Thus, in Schelling’s reading of  the 
monotheistic dogma our apprehension of  the divine through 
the dogma elicits a metaphysical discourse on the notion of  
monotheism. Subsequently, we can go back to the dogmatic 
formulation and see it as describing a representation of  God, 
that is, the one true God manifest on mount Sinai, which is the 
actual embodiment of  the metaphysical realities we previously 
contemplated. 
In this respect, as Francesco Tomatis meticulously notices, 
it is important to remark how for Schelling it is not enough to in-
dividuate the God of  dogmatic theism as the final goal of  phil-
osophical inquiry. In turn, the goal and perpetual object of  phi-
losophy lies in investigating the conditions of  possibility of  the 
‹‹living system in which all others coexist››. In other words, we 
cannot stop to the dogmatic understanding of  God as opposed 
to other divinities. Instead, we have to analyze the monotheis-
tic dogma in order to develop a metaphysical understanding of  
how God can be known as including in his reality those deities6. 
As he is described as a living system, we should avoid thinking 
of  the one, all-embracing God as a static essence, or some sort 
of  Hickian unfathomable object beyond space and time that 
religions depict imperfectly. By contrast, as the ground of  all re-
ligious systems is described as living, hence as a dynamic force in 
which representations of  the divine coexist as expressions of  this 
life. Furthermore, the living God of  whom metaphysics traces 
the conditions of  possibility can be discerned in history only a 
posteriori, through the exercise of  philosophy on those systems 
coexisting in him (such as the Biblical representation of  God).
6 F. TomaTiS, Kenosis del Logos, Città Nuova, Roma 1994, 50-51.
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Thus, the philosophical interpretation of  the biblical dog-
ma of  divine uniqueness, lays the path to the understanding of  
the metaphysical DNA of  all religious systems and therefore of  
the representations they contain. Through the efforts of  philos-
ophy, we come to experience God in his concrete expressions 
while being conscious that these do not express him exhaustive-
ly because of  his over-uniqueness. Hence, philosophy boosts 
thought, giving it the means to expand beyond itself, and reach-
ing to its object as found in the notion of  monotheism, which is 
positively expressed in the biblical dogma7.
It is then clear how for Schelling philosophical activity does 
not aim neither at reducing the validity of  biblical monotheism 
nor at overcoming it. As he puts it while discussing the Holy 
Trinity, what he aims to do through his metaphysical accounts 
of  the Christian dogmas is not to weaken their traditional for-
mulations or descriptions. Rather, he wishes to expand them, 
in order to allow them to cover elements of  the Old Testament 
and of  Paganism that otherwise would remain unexplained 
from a Christian point of  view8. The question that Schelling is 
entertaining is not how he can use philosophy to substitute the 
old dogmatic formulations and explain the traditional doctrines 
better. Rather, he is working with the problem of  which sort of  
philosophy he can develop on the ground of  the Christian doc-
trines in order to ‹‹augment›› these doctrines themselves. 
Borrowing upon Raimon Panikkar, we could say that 
Schelling sees dogmas as the way we walk in order to reach 
fullness and communion with God9.  Thus, neither do dogmas 
7 J. WirTh, The Conspiracy of  Life: Meditations on Schelling and his Time, SUNY 
Press, Albany 2003, 162.
8 F. TomaTiS, Filosofia della Rivelazione: Ragione e Rivelazione nell’ultimo Schelling, 
Bompiani, Milano 2002, 569. 
9 R. Panikkar, Il Cristo Sconosciuto dell’Induismo, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1976, 
58.
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exclusively serve doxological or pastoral needs, nor do they for-
bid the employment of  our intellectual capacities. On the con-
trary, dogmas call on us to mobilize all of  our faculties and, as 
in Schelling’s case, they can help us to approach God also from 
the perspective of  reason, by allowing us to explore the divine 
dimension from a metaphysical point of  view. Furthermore, the 
upshot of  this interpretation of  the Christian dogma as portray-
ing God as ‹‹over-unique›› and providing the matter for all reli-
gious representations, is that we can expand our insight into the 
nature of  other religions. This means, that there is something 
of  God to be found in all religious representations, and that not 
even the monotheistic image of  him as the one God can exhaust 
his reality.
Schelling chooses to label as spirituality God’s capacity 
of  being one while allowing a plurality of  manifestations. In 
Schelling’s terminology, to be a spirit and therefore to express 
spirituality, indicates the capacity to remain in a state of  poten-
tiality while being in act, and vice-versa. Accordingly, God has 
the capacity of  dwelling completely in oneself  and remaining in 
a full state of  potentiality, while at the same time becoming fully 
another in a completely alienating actualization. He is ‹‹[…] 
what that is continuously in act, without ceasing to be potency 
(source of  being), what in being remains in control of  himself, 
and vice-versa being in potency it is nonetheless act […]››.10 
This may sound as a somewhat stipulative meaning of  what it 
means to be a spirit. However, Schelling claims that ‹‹[…] For 
what owns himself, […] that in act stays in potency, […] lan-
guage does not own any other term but spirit››11.  Quite simply, 
Schelling is making appeal to the fact that, given the religious 
10 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 61-62. 
11 Ivi, 61-62.
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milieu he was part of, he could not find any better word avail-
able.
As regards his case for his understanding of  monotheism, 
Schelling begins his argument with a consideration about the 
nature of  equality. According to the German philosopher, for 
two things to be described as equals, we must hold them to have 
something in common. At the very least, they must share pure 
being. However, if  God as presented in the dogma is that being 
which has no equal, the one who is even above the other deities, 
then he does not share his being with anything. In this respect, 
God ‹‹[…] cannot be a being. […] But if  God is not a being, 
something that just participates in being, then he cannot be but 
being itself››. In other words, Schelling argues that since God is 
the One without any equal, he cannot be just a being among 
many. Rather, he must be being itself. In this way, all other be-
ings come to participate in him as they exist, but at the same 
time he does not share his being, meaning his way of  being, with 
none of  the other beings. Hence, God is unique in his being and 
at the same time he is in communion with all beings as they de-
pend on him precisely because of  what in his nature makes him 
incomparable to them.
Furthermore, adds Schelling, being itself  is ‹‹[…] the pre-
liminary and necessary concept of  God, that we must posit in 
order to posit God (and not: a god). Therefore, God is being 
itself. But to be being itself  is not his divinity, but rather the 
presupposition of  his divinity››12. Thus, the concept of  God in-
cludes oneness, which becomes the presupposition of  any mani-
festation of  God. Crucially then, God is not a one opposed to a 
plurality, as it would be in the dogmatic context. Instead, God’s 
oneness escapes the dichotomy between the one and the many. 
This follows because if  God is being itself, then as mentioned in 
12 Ivi, 35.
9
A
isth
em
a, In
tern
ation
al Jou
rn
al  Vol. IV
 (20
17), fascicolo 1
W
W
W
.A
IS
T
H
E
M
A
.E
U
The many faces of God
the paragraph above all entities participate in him as the source 
of  their being. Thus, he is what gives ground and precedes the 
relationship between the one and the many, insofar as he is the 
source of  the elements of  this opposition. Accordingly, God is 
one in an absolute sense, and because of  that he grounds the 
possibility of  there being a one in a relative sense, namely as 
opposed to the many.
2. The Doctrine of  the Potencies
We come now to another of  the main aspects of  Schelling’s lec-
tures on monotheism that I wish to discuss, namely the doctrine 
of  potencies. Since this doctrine comes in different shapes as 
Schelling’s work progresses over the years, I shall focus on pre-
senting the outlines of  such theory as exposed and employed in 
Schelling’s lectures concerning monotheism. In brief, we might 
say that in Schelling’s view the doctrine of  the potencies is the 
final stage of  reason’s search for the metaphysical conditions 
and structure for any positive manifestation of  God13.
This doctrine comes as the result of  the application to God 
of  those which Schelling sees as the fundamental interests of  
philosophy. According to him, philosophy is mainly concerned 
with the study of  the three prime principles or causes. Although 
thanks to their essential involvement in all beings’ essence these 
principles can be found in any region of  reality, they come to 
their utmost presentation through this doctrine as they are ex-
amined in the context of  the divine life. Schelling does not offer a 
deduction of  the three potencies, but rather retrieves them from 
the philosophical tradition, quoting Aristotle and the Pitagorics. 
These causes, although they can go under different names, are 
always three and the same: what is unlimited, what limits the 
13 TomaTiS, L’argomento Ontologico, 152.
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unlimited, and the cause which is the object of  itself. These are, 
according to Schelling, the logical and metaphysical principles 
through which we can read the fundamental structure of  reali-
ty. Specifically, by representing God through the connection of  
these three prime principles, we come to understand him in the 
fashion of  a metaphysical trinity.14 Accordingly, as we shall bet-
ter see in the next chapter, Schelling finds the Trinitarian dogma 
to be the best representation of  God as one and as constituted 
by the three potencies. Consistently with a Christian point of  
view, Schelling understands monotheism as implying Trinitar-
ianism. Hence, just as philosophy augments the monotheistic 
dogma, it also brings forth the doctrine of  the potencies as an 
expansion of  the Christian account of  God as the Holy Trinity. 
God is produced by these three potencies, while at the same 
time he coordinates and originates them in virtue of  him being 
the One, thereby constituting the above mentioned living sys-
tem in which all others coexist15. Thus, even through metaphys-
ics we cannot grasp God directly in his oneness. However, ac-
cording to the German philosopher the three potencies are God 
only when considered together, as he comes to be seen as an 
internally differentiated whole. Paraphrasing Tomatis’ words, 
the three potencies show the one God16, only if  we read them in 
their oneness and not mistakenly as many separated elements. 
Hence, as much as to grasp directly the One as an object in 
itself  is impossible, the three potencies manifest God’s oneness 
indirectly through their own essential communion. 
In the context of  the lectures on Monotheism the three 
potencies are labeled by Schelling as –A, +A, and +-A. The 
first two potencies, -A and +A, correspond to the unlimited 
14 Ivi, 151-152.
15 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 106-107.
16 TomaTiS, L’argomento Ontologico, 131.
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and what limits the unlimited. They are concerned with rep-
resenting two absolute but in a sense static dimensions that we 
discover in God. On one hand, we find –A to be absolute and 
pure potentiality, namely God as the source of  everything. On 
the other hand, +A is the opposite of  the first potency, namely 
God as absolute and pure act. Thus, -A is God as he contains 
all possibilities, and +A is God as he actually expresses all pos-
sibilities. If  these two were the only stages to be found in God’s 
life, we would be stuck with two irreconcilable and opposing 
terms, something which would seem to break God’s unity. The 
solution of  this impasse is +-A, the third potency, where the two 
opposites meet one another. This third potency represents as it 
were the union and the indifference of  the first two potencies, 
being able to be in act while being in potency and vice-versa. 
This third potency is also what properly manifests God’s spiri-
tuality, in his capacity of  fully actualizing himself  while neither 
dissolving nor losing his being in potency in his own outward 
expression17. Therefore, +-A is the union of  the two distinct 
moments represented by the other potencies. This, happens as 
they intertwine and mutually rely on one another to be rep-
resented. However, this third potency is not simply a ‹‹putting 
together›› of  the first two. +-A is a unity, namely God in his 
full explication18. Later in his lectures, Schelling remarks that in 
the doctrine of  the potencies with each posited element ‹‹is at 
the same time [posited] the postulate of  the following one, and 
the reality of  any preceding moment […] the first potency is 
such just because the second one follows, and this is such just as 
17 TomaTiS, L’argomento Ontologico, 129-131.
18 J. E. WilSon, Schellings Mythologie: zur Auslegung der Philosophie der Mythologie und 
der Offenbarung, Stuttgart, Fromman-Holzboog 1993, 28.
12
A
is
th
em
a,
 In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 J
ou
rn
al
  V
ol
. I
V
 (
20
17
),
 fa
sc
ic
ol
o 
1
W
W
W
.A
IS
T
H
E
M
A
.E
U
Tommaso Manzon
the third one follows››19. Furthermore, in Schelling’s words the 
three potencies are a ‹‹plurality, not a multiplicity››20. The three 
potencies are a set of  fundamentally interrelated elements and 
they show the One beyond them thanks to the fact that they are 
not able to persist without the other two. 
In this respect, I wish also to underline the fact that the 
three prime principles are called potencies, as I hold that this is 
not simply a stylistic choice. Rather, I believe that this term that 
Schelling employs21 underlines the fact that these principles are 
dynamic and active. As God is a multiplicity, he is more akin to 
an organism rather than to an aggregate, hence a simple pile 
of  casually related elements. Interrelatedness is fundamental to 
God’s being, as he is constituted of  different interlocking compo-
nents, joined and interacting one with another just as the parts 
of  living beings do. Thus, the doctrine of  potencies is concerned 
with outlining as it were the dynamics of  God’s life as he comes 
to assume his spiritual shape. Of  course, it is understood that to 
speak of  dynamics in this context might be misleading, and we 
have to notice that this is not meant in terms of  a temporal pro-
cess: the world of  reason is a logical one, where neither proper 
events, nor a succession of  events can take place22. Hence, this 
movement happens eternally, i.e. beyond space and time, as it 
is a condition for being in space and time to be. Therefore, the 
three potencies stand in an eternal and thus logical succession, 
where all moments are present at the same time, intertwining 
one another.
19 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung, in id., Schellings Werke, hrsg. 
von  Manfred Schroter, Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munchen 1943; tr. 
it., Filosofia della Rivelazione, a cura di Adriano Bausola, Bompiani,  Milano 
2002, 217.
20 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 69.
21 The German Potenzen. 
22 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 109.
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As we will better see in the next section, God permeates 
creation and is accountable for the being of  everything. This 
is true not only in terms of  God providing the ontological core 
of  what there is, but also in terms of  him providing the eternal 
rules according to which any sort of  being unfolds. This follows 
as the potencies express the metaphysical framework of  all pos-
sible manifestations of  being. In Schelling’s words ‹‹these three 
concepts are the true original concepts, the true original poten-
cies of  all being››23. In this respect, the three potencies are to be 
considered as universals, which at the same time are completely 
present in being allowing it to exist and persist24. 
As mentioned multiple times over the course of  this section, 
the three potencies are everything’s metaphysical condition of  
existence. By portraying the potencies in God, Schelling gives of  
them the highest depiction possible, namely as the metaphysical 
condition of  being of  being itself. Since any other being has 
being itself  and therefore God as a condition of  existence and 
persistence, all beings have the three potencies as conditions of  
their existence and persistence. Accordingly, God as the creator 
and also as being itself  is the condition of  the potentiality of  
all that can be, the condition of  the actuality of  all, and the 
condition of  the unity and persistence of  all as possibility and 
actuality spiritually intertwine. Because of  this he is the  prime 
origin of  any other being once he manifests positively in our fi-
nite reality25. Subsequently, and crucially for our enquiry, as the 
three potencies describe the ideal conditions of  being of  God, 
they can describe as well his manifestations in our symbolic rep-
resentations of  him. 
23 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 64.
24 L. duprè, The Role of  Mythology in Schelling’s Late Philosophy, in The Journal of  
Religion, 87 (2007), 1-20, here 3.
25 Ivi, 2. 
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3. God and Creation
I will now present the implications that Schelling’s account of  
monotheism has for the relationship between God and creation. 
This, shall also be put into context with Schelling’s reading of  
Genesis’ narrative of  humanity’s fall.  This way, I aim to discuss 
which are according to Schelling the results of  the Fall, and how 
these produce the situation which marks the beginning of  the 
theogonical process. 
According to a motive often recurring in his works, Schell-
ing understands creation as the product of  a self-externalization 
underwent by God, as a sort of  eternal kenotic process, through 
which God empties himself  and becomes something different26. 
In other words, the process of  creation is that of  God’s free 
self-negation and manifestation in a finite reality, thus creating a 
world which is nothing but ‹‹extra-divine›› life27. As we have seen 
in the previous chapter, the three potencies are the archetypical 
structure of  any being, God included. Hence, as God creates 
he does so according to the three potencies, in fact creating a 
spatio-temporal image of  his own structure28. The structure of  
creation replicates God’s, in that it presents the three potencies 
as the forces shaping it. Thus, although creation is extra-divine 
life, it is always in full communion with God. 
Schelling carefully distinguishes creation from manifesta-
tion, where the second is something necessary and mechanic, 
and the first is the result of  a free action of  the divine will. How-
ever, he argues, for creation to be possible there must be some-
26 limone, Inizio e Trinità: il Neoplatonismo Giovanneo nell’Ultimo Schelling, ETS, 
Pisa 2013 54. 
27 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 469.
28 R. F. BroWn, The Late Philosophy of  Schelling: the Influence of  Boehme on the works 
of  1809-1815, Associated University Press, London 1977, 21
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thing intermediate between God and the act of  creation itself. 
Without this, ‹‹the world could be only thought as an immedi-
ate and therefore necessary emanation of  the divine essence››29. 
This intermediate element is the first potency, that which con-
tains all things in potency. This, in relationship to creation is seen 
as containing the prototypes of  all beings which God then puts 
into image according to the three potencies as the rules presid-
ing the unfolding of  being. Schelling, in keeping with an ancient 
tradition, calls these prototypes the divine ideas. Furthermore, 
as God creates by staring at it through an act of  self-contempla-
tion, Schelling identifies this potency as the wisdom of  the Book 
of  Proverbs30. Hence, on one hand wisdom is outside God as it 
stands in front of  him as an object of  contemplation. However, 
on the other hand it always stays in God as it is nothing but 
God’s probing in the first potency, namely a part of  himself  - 
wisdom is nothing else but what the original Ur-will, the koinonia 
of  the three potencies imagines once it stare at itself31.
Thus, it is not sufficient to proclaim God’s necessary one-
ness in respect to a multiplicity of  deities, in order to state the 
full consequences of  there being only one divine matter. As the 
source of  all being, God creates everything out of  himself  and 
is present in nature sustaining it as the result of  an act as it were 
of  alienation from himself. Hence, in his relationship to creation 
the divine substance can be talked of  as a vital force underlying 
all of  creation32. Moreover, as the divine substance is by itself  in-
divisible and is present in all created realities, then is completely 
present in all of  them. In a sense, in this picture the part is the 
29 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 489.  
30 Ivi, 491-493.
31 limone, Inizio e Trinità, 129.
32 P. clayTon. The Problem of  God in Modern Thought, Eerdmans Pub., Grand 
Rapids 2000, 480. 
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whole and the whole is not essentially anything more than what 
the part essentially is33. Therefore, being God is the one absolute 
reality and nothing can be that God is not fully present in it, and 
vice-versa34. 
This is true of  human beings in particular, as we are the 
images of  God being spirits like him although in a limited way. 
Through his self-manifestation God progressively creates the 
natural world, sealing this process with an act of  self-imagina-
tion of  God himself. According to Schelling, this happens with 
the creation of  humanity as the human soul possesses the fac-
ulty of  imagination, namely of  putting things into images. Just 
like God we are able of  imagining although only in a finite way. 
According to Douglas Hedley, we can define our imagination as 
the capacity of  putting experience into one35, a creative nisus to-
ward unity36. Hence, while God puts things into image in terms 
of  creating them out of  himself, we can only put what already 
exists into unity. 
What happens, is that God manifests himself  in creation 
while persisting and sustaining it without losing his identity 
thanks to his perfect spirituality. Furthermore, God becomes 
self-conscious of  this dynamic as he permeates our conscious-
ness, and as we imagine him as the creator and sustainer, at 
the same time he imagines himself  as such. In Schelling’s own 
words, ‹‹[…] human consciousness is the goal and end of  the 
entire natural process. In the human consciousness is reached 
that point where the potencies come back together in their unity, 
[…] where what eliminates God turns into what posits God››37. 
33 M. mangiagalli, Concezione Creazionista e Incarnazione di Dio nel Pensiero di F. 
W. J. Schelling, 29.
34 limone, Inizio e Trinità, Aracne, Roma 2013, 37.
35 D. hedley, Living Forms of  the Imagination, T&T Clark, London 2008, 48.
36 Ivi, 52.
37 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 111.
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God works through creation and eventually surfaces in human 
consciousness looking back at himself  and his work. Imagina-
tion is then a process that mirrors the infinite as the infinite looks 
back at himself38, as the human soul’s contemplation of  God is 
God’s contemplation of  himself. Moreover, contemplating God 
as the origin and preserver of  creation we can also reflect on this 
relationship. Consequently, we reflect on the prime principles 
of  reality and the causes of  creation and, in Schelling’s view, we 
come to grasp the three potencies as the expression of  God’s life 
and as ruling the unfolding of  reality. The human soul is in this 
sense a bridge between creation and God insofar as it is part of  
creation but is also able to join creation to God by expressing 
God’s imagination of  himself. 
Hence, the result of  God’s creative act is the same as that of  
God’s eternal coming to be as God the Spirit. Inasmuch as there 
is no absolute division in the One, similarly there is no such divi-
sion in creation from the perspective of  its relationship to God, 
as all its aspects are elements of  an essential unity. All beings, 
physical and spiritual are fully part of  the divine life, and they 
ought to be considered in all respects as manifestations of  the 
one God. In this sense, creation is at the same time the negation 
as well as a part of  God’s own plenitude. Subsequently, for God 
to be the all-encompassing One, he must be able to include in it-
self  its negation, namely the realm of  being. The human soul is 
what is able to keep every pole of  this relationship between God 
and creation together in a coherent image. Again, this goes back 
to our imagination, namely what makes us amphibious in re-
spect to natural reality as we are part of  it but we can transcend 
it39. Therefore, through imagination, we can bind together in a 
coherent vision the natural and the super-natural, thus bringing 
38 hedley, The Iconic Imagination, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2016, 76.
39 hedley, Living Forms, 37
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the process of  creation to an end by perfectly imagining  us, 
God, and creation as  an harmonious unity.
The relationship between God and humanity brings with 
it also the seeds of  religion as the expression of  our connection 
with God, and therefore of  religion as a historical phenomenon. 
In discussing the fundamental nature of  our relationship with 
God, Schelling approaches the narrative of  Genesis in a way 
analogous to that which he uses for the monotheistic dogma. 
Therefore, Schelling reads the history of  the original couple as 
carrying in itself  an account of  the ideal or negative image of  
our relationship with God.  In this respect, the Fall, as narrated 
in the book of  Genesis, is a catastrophic event preceding history, 
which Schelling argues to be visible a posteriori in the fact that 
nature fails to display the unity it should have, as it is made un-
able to do so by the Fall itself40. Consequently, Schelling reads 
the end of  the Edenic condition as the key to understand the 
historical, less-than-ideal positive forms assumed by this rela-
tionship as well as the beginning of  human history as the quest 
for retrieving the Edenic condition. 
According to Schelling, the Edenic condition of  commu-
nion with God was so perfect that human consciousness beheld 
God inside itself  and not in front of  itself, as if  he were an ob-
ject. Humanity did not even have ‹‹[…] the time to create rep-
resentations or concepts of  God […]››41. Hence, prime Edenic 
humanity is the perfect embodied image of  the absolute42. In 
other words, in its ideal and eternal, perfect contemplation of  
God, humanity fulfills perfectly its role of  mediator as it produc-
es an image of  itself, creation, and God as essentially in com-
40 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 605. 
41 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 113.
42 A. dezi, Potenza e Realta il Sovrarealismo Ontologico nel Pensiero di F. W. J. Schelling, 
Mimesis, Udine 2013, 107.
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munion. In this, humanity also acts as it were in the same way 
the third potency does. Just like the Spirit as +-A is able to bring 
together –A and +A, so does humanity with God and creation: 
‹‹Human consciousness is a mediator, a third between both of  
them››43. However, argues Schelling, although humanity’s es-
sence is the same as God’s, namely pure freedom44, humanity is 
nonetheless only a finite replica of  God. Hence, humanity can 
go astray in its employment of  this freedom, thus provoking its 
own fall from grace and in so doing casting creation outside of  
communion with God45. 
As God bestows humanity with absolute freedom46, human-
ity is on the ground of  that so free that it can in principle negate 
itself  and its essential nature.  Moreover, the Ur-Mensch’s first 
movement cannot be but away from God, as in a sense in the 
ideal state humanity is so close to God that no further proximity 
is possible - in Eden’s ideal condition we ‹‹adhere to God››47. As 
Schelling thinks of  the primordial communion as a condition 
of  immobility on our part, accordingly the first movement as 
the beginning of  activity and history cannot but result in the 
breaking of  this communion48.  Furthermore, the result of  our 
first historical act of  self-knowledge, is humanity’s first actual 
consciousness of  God as a separate being, as before history we 
were not conscious of  God, but simply existed according to the 
‹‹substance of  our consciousness›› - in eternity there is no con-
sciousness of  God as such, but rather and simply communion 
43 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 113.
44 P. Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling Philosophical Development, 
Bucknell University Presss, Lewisburg 1974, 45.
45 mangiagalli, Concezione Creazionista e Incarnazione di Dio nel pensiero di F. W. J. 
Schelling, 32.
46 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 114.
47 Ivi, 112.
48 Ivi, 113.
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with him49.   His condition, says Schelling, is already ‹‹affected 
by mythology››, hence by a spoilt understanding of  God and his 
relationship to us50. 
Nonetheless, our link with God is never completely shat-
tered by the ruinous separation occurring with the Fall. Human-
ity maintains its imaginative power, and thanks to his freedom 
can in principle return in God. In fact, since humanity’s nature 
is of  being that which posits God, it cannot help but eventually 
following this route. As Schelling says ‹‹[humanity] falls victim 
to a new process through which it is led in the original relation-
ship, being newly transformed in what posits God, and thus this 
process must be acknowledged as theogonic […] a repetition 
of  the original process through which humanity had become 
that which posits God››.51 Hence, on one level no arbitrariness is 
involved in this process, as it begins and ends in God: humanity 
necessarily brings back the awareness of  its communion with 
God consciously and in history while unfolding anew his essen-
tial nature. Contemplation of  God is thus reached not because 
its object lies at the end of  the process but by contrast because 
we find at the very origin of  it52. On another level, this pro-
cess ‹‹although real in itself, independent of  human freedom 
and thought […] takes place in our consciousness […] and thus 
takes place through the production of  representations››53. Thus, 
the theogonical process is influenced by the arbitrariness of  his-
torical and cultural conditions of  the human agents furthering 
it, as the different steps of  the process are embodied by and 
49 Ivi, 112. 
50 Ivi, 112.
51 Ivi, 114.
52 J. holSinger Sherman, Partakers of  the Divine: Contemplation and the Practice of  
Philosophy, Fortress Press, Minneapolis 2014, 4.
53 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 114-115.
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in different socio-historical situations54. Therefore, these are 
the two sides of  the theogonical process, namely the historical 
process of  God’s self-understanding through the human soul55. 
This movement of  the human spirit back toward God occurs 
after the Fall and, as we shall better see in the next chapter, is 
the result of  the combined activities of  God in creation and our 
receptivity to them and capacity of  putting them into images.
4. Mythology and Revelation
As mentioned above, the direct consequence of  the Fall is 
the beginning of  what Schelling calls the theogonical process, 
namely the progress of  human religious consciousness toward 
a renewed communion with God56. I shall now discuss how 
Schelling divides the theogonical process into two major stages, 
that is, mythology and revealed religion. 
Mythology is a stage of  the theogonical process during 
which humanity is unable to grasp correctly the structure of  
God’s life. In this respect, mythological images of  God such as 
the polytheist ones do result from a faulty understanding of  the 
three potencies of  God. In other words, polytheists, rather than 
conceiving the three potencies in their essential oneness, repre-
sent them as embodied in a number of  deities, often divided and 
opposed to one another57.
Therefore, mythology is marked by imperfect representa-
tions of  God. However, these become gradually better at pre-
senting the divine following a process that Schelling describes 
54 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Mythologie, in ID., Schellings Werke, hrsg. von 
Manfred Schroter, Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munchen 1943; tr. it., Fi-
losofia della Mitologia, a cura di Lidia Procesi, Mursia, Milano 1998, 181.
55 P. clayTon, The Problem of  God in Modern Thought, 476.
56 dupré, The Role of  Mythology in Schelling, 6-7.
57 WilSon, Schellings Mythologie, 52.
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as the religious equivalent of  the regeneration process of  a dis-
eased organism58. The history of  mythology becomes a record 
of  our evolving relationship with God, as we try to re-integrate 
the multiplicity with oneness59. Hence, in Schelling’s vocabulary 
mythology is a concept which embraces all those representa-
tions of  God which constitute steps of  the process to a renewed 
conception of  God as he really is. The result of  this process 
is the constitution of  an ‹‹inclusive monotheism››, namely of  a 
monotheism which includes creation in God’s being60.
According to Schelling, all mythologies follow a pattern 
based on the three principles, representing them in shapes influ-
enced by their particular socio-historical environment61. None-
theless, only some mythologies manage to include all three po-
tencies in their representations. Even the most realized among 
mythologies, that is, the Greek one, is still not fully conscious of  
God’s spiritual nature, and subsequently fails to represent the 
three potencies as one62. In this regard, Schelling is crystal-clear 
since the very beginning of  his lectures: ‹‹the Tree of  all reli-
gions, which has its roots in monotheism, in the end results nec-
essarily in the highest manifestation of  monotheism, namely in 
Christianity››63. Mythology is a prelude to the complete and true 
religion, and even its best manifestations fall short of  Christian 
ones. However, as they are part of  the same tree, all religions, 
mythologies included, are united to all the others: as Schelling 
puts it, ‹‹no actual religion can be separated from another actual 
religion [...] in it there can be nothing but the same forces as 
58 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 307.
59 dupré, The Role of  Mythology in Schelling, 6.
60 Ivi, 1.
61 Ivi, 5.
62 Ivi, 13.
63 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 79.
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those that we find in the revealed religion››64. Since God is one, 
no genuine religious expression can come but from him, as he is 
the Absolute at the root of  everything. 
What makes Schelling set Christianity apart from other tra-
ditions is precisely its character of  being a revealed religion. My-
thology is a natural process like healing, and thus, argues Schell-
ing, ‹‹[mythology] is a religion where no productive role is given 
to the deity as such››. Christianity, however, is another story65. 
Thanks to God’s special act of  revelation, Christianity is based 
on the full awareness of  God according to his spirituality, and 
bears what mythologies lack66. In other words, all the traditional 
symbols of  Christianity and their dogmatic expositions stand as 
representations of  an image of  God where the three potencies 
are reconciled as One67. Hence, while the birth of  Christianity 
is not the last development of  the relationship between God and 
humanity, in Christianity the theogonical process comes to an 
end in that after it there is no further progression in the develop-
ment of  our images of  God. Christian representations of  God 
are ‹‹perfect››, insofar as they do not lack anything in terms of  
opening a way for us to be conscious of  God’s nature.
This claim is made by Schelling mainly in relation to the 
Trinitarian representation of  God. As mentioned above, just 
like Schelling expands the understanding of  monotheism, sim-
ilarly he gives an account of  the dogma of  the Trinity as a rep-
resentation of  God as the spiritual union of  the three potencies. 
Accordingly, as mythology presents imperfect representations 
of  the three potencies, its representations are imperfect versions 
64 Schelling, Filosofia della Mitologia, 139.
65 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 309.
66 P. hayner, Reason and Existence: Schelling’s Philosophy of  History, E.J. Brill, 
Leiden 1967, 160-161. 
67 WilSon, Schelling und Nietzsche, 93.   
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of  the Trinity and of  monotheism as the doctrines perfectly ex-
pressing the nature of  the potencies. Thus, we now see how 
Schelling meant to provide an explanation of  non-Christian reli-
gious phenomena through Christian means, as he expands these 
two doctrines in order to make them the key to the understand-
ing of  our relationship with the Absolute. Hence, says Schell-
ing, while we normally consider the Trinity as an ‹‹arbitrary››, 
‹‹mysterious››, and ‹‹characteristically Christian›› teaching, it is 
in fact a ‹‹universally human doctrine, given with the concept of  
monotheism››68. This universality of  the Trinity follows insofar 
as its content is present in all religious expressions, as each of  
them represents imperfectly the potencies and their workings. 
However, this universally human doctrine is fully communicat-
ed in history as such only through the Christian revelation. 
Thus, Christianity is in Schelling’s perspective the only re-
cipient of  the divine revelation that once again discloses God’s 
spiritual oneness to humanity. However, although he decides to 
prioritize a particular tradition, the result of  Schelling’s explo-
ration of  monotheism is God as the unfathomable unity of  the 
three potencies, something common to all traditions as their 
original ground. We have also to keep in mind God’s absolute 
freedom, which allows him not to be exhausted by any presen-
tation of  himself. Thus, it is fair to say that in Schelling’s view 
God is free enough to deny himself  as Trinity, in the sense that 
neither does he have any necessary relationship with, nor is fully 
explicated by any of  his manifestations, not even the most per-
fect one69. Although the Trinity is the best presentation possible 
of  God’s nature, it is possible in principle to think God beyond 
it, as he manifests himself  in other, less perfect images.
68 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 76-77.
69 limone, Inizio e Trinità, 41.
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In this sense, Schelling’s perspective divides religious histo-
ry pre-dating Christianity into two converging narratives, both 
leading up to God’s incarnation in Jesus. On one hand, we find 
the profane history of  paganism, which reaches the presence but 
not the consciousness of  the third potency. On the other hand, 
we find the sacred history of  the progressive revelation of  the 
true God to the people of  Israel. The birth of  Christ eventually 
puts an end to this process, therefore bringing about the only 
true religion70. Schelling’s account of  monotheism is obviously 
instrumental in telling these two narratives, on which Schelling 
spends a large deal of  his lectures. However, this same account 
of  monotheism gives us the possibility to transcend the applica-
tions it was meant for. For example, from a Christian point of  
view augmented by Schelling’s perspective, although we believe 
the Trinity to be the most perfect representation of  God, we 
can think of  him appearing in different images. We could even 
think of  a tradition giving a non-personalistic account of  the 
One, without because of  this having to deny that God is man-
ifest through it. Hence, this non-personalistic tradition’s repre-
sentations would be as close to the Trinity as much as they are 
able to express in some shape that which Huston Smith would 
call religion’s underlying geometry, namely the prime principles 
which are expressed as the three potencies in their oneness in 
the Holy Trinity71.
5. The Many Faces of  God
I shall now turn to present Schelling’s understanding of  our re-
ligious representations. In this respect, I shall defend the thesis 
70 hayner, Reason and Existence, 162-163.
71 H. SmiTh, The Forgotten Truth: the Primordial Tradition, Harper & Row, New 
York 1976, IX.
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I briefly presented in the introduction, and show that Schelling 
holds religious images to be symbols, that is, manifestations of  
the transcendent which grow out of  our relationship with God. 
These, play the role of  connecting us to the Absolute, with ever 
increasing depth as the theogonical process unfolds.
First of  all, it is crucial to underline that in his account of  
how we represent God, Schelling is eager to reject the idea that 
our images of  God are merely mental projections. In this regard, 
borrowing upon Leonardo Lotito, we could say that Schelling’s 
position is that religious representations are objectively the re-
sult of  the theogonical process, and subjectively the product of  
human consciousness72.  Furthermore, as Robert F. Brown puts 
it, the kind of  knowledge typical of  mythology is recollection, as 
we progressively remember God’s nature73. Accordingly, all re-
ligious representations will be the result of  the creative response 
of  human consciousness to the divine, as a re-discovery of  a 
necessity found in our Edenic, eternal and pre-reflexive immer-
sion in God74. In other words, on one level religious representa-
tions are the results of  each of  the many acts of  manifestation 
of  God to humanity, while on another they are formed by the 
finite consciousness which is the receptacle of  these manifesta-
tions and gradually sees in them a recurring theme, namely the 
workings of  the three potencies. Therefore, our images of  God 
are the expressions of  a cooperative process of  the human with 
the divine, as they work together toward the goal of  awakening 
humanity to God’s true nature.
In this respect, the formation of  the worlds of  religious 
imagination can be described as born out of  a participatory 
72 Shelling, Il Monoteismo, 17.
73 BroWn, The later philosophy of  Schelling, 260-261.
74 J. day, Voegelin, Schelling, and the Philosophy of  Historical Existence, University of  
Missouri Press, Columbia 2003, 72.
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relationship between humanity and the divine. In general, the 
concept of  participation makes reference to a constitutive struc-
ture according to which a being has some quality or perfection 
received from a source which has the fullness of  the same75. 
Hence, from the point of  view of  a metaphysics of  participa-
tion, the fundamental relationship between the finite and the 
infinite is not one of  dualism or opposition. On the contrary, 
such a perspective posits that these two spheres are essentially 
in relation one with another, with the finite participating in the 
infinite and receiving its defining features from it. Nonetheless, 
this connection does not cause them to sacrifice their differenc-
es, nor does it cancel the distance between them76. 
In the context of  Schelling’s philosophy, our participation 
of  God is evident in the relationship of  shared creative activity, 
which is the fundamental intercourse between the human and 
the divine77. Hence, by employing our imagination, we partic-
ipate in God’s creativity and power, as we replicate finitely the 
act of  creation.  Although our finitude makes us able to create 
independently and against God’s wishes, we are never out of  
communion with him as otherwise we could not create at all. 
Thus, our creativity depends essentially on and is not opposed 
to God’s creativity. Moreover, they work in communion with 
each other insofar as we are attuned to him and come to repre-
sent him faithfully through our imagination. 
Schelling’s assessment of  religious representations is 
grounded on the combination of  such a metaphysics of  partic-
ipation and the doctrine of  potencies. This follows, insofar as 
these representations are the fruits of  our participation in God’s 
75 J. H. Sherman, A Genealogy of  Participation, in J. Ferrer – J. h. Sherman, The 
Participatory Turn, State University of  New York Press, Albany 2008, 82.
76 Ivi, 92.
77 Ivi, 98-99.
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creativity and in that they must be explained as living expres-
sions of  the three potencies. According to Schelling, the three 
prime principles or three potencies are ‹‹what serve as a media-
tion between the empirical being and the prime cause [God]››.78 
As we come to represent God from our particular conditions 
we always imagine him through the prime principles and at the 
same time presuming them, as through them God is original-
ly in relationship with us. In other words, we unavoidably par-
ticipate in God through the three potencies. Hence, according 
to the fact that they contain the seeds of  all possible logic and 
metaphysics, the different products of  religious imagination will 
always be shaped having the three prime principles on the back-
ground. 
It is crucial to underline, how Schelling insists that the three 
potencies are not to be understood simply as epistemic princi-
ples. They are not just categories which allow us to represent 
finitely some sort of  God an-sich standing beyond experience. 
If  this was Schelling’s perspective, then he would still be linger-
ing in what he takes to be the realm of  dogmatic theism, the 
opposition of  God and the world, with us applying a concep-
tual framework to a thing-in-itself79. In turn, the three prime 
principles are objective and real forces, ‹‹immediate principles 
of  being» which continually appear, in the same shape, in the 
outwardly multifaceted reality which is creation. By contrast, 
the categories of  modern philosophy are, according to Schelling 
‹‹concepts››, purely ‹‹subjective mediations›› between the world 
and God80. While concepts only abstractly mediate between 
God and creation, as the workings of  the three potencies are 
those of  God, we can imagine the divine substance as a vital 
78 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 409.
79 clayTon, The Problem of  God in Modern Thought, 479.
80 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 409.
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force manifest in all nature81. Since our images of  him are part 
of  creation, they are pervaded by this vital force and thus by 
God himself. In this respect, we could say that in Schelling’s 
view, religious images are not just symbols but living symbols. 
They are quite literally God’s manifestations in our eyes, as their 
participation in God as the vital force present in nature open 
them to the transcendent and to infinity. 
In this sense, our images of  the One are the results of  our 
participation in God’s life and they are strengthened the more 
intense our participation is. Accordingly, we can see Christian 
symbols as finding the roots of  their superiority in that revela-
tion signals a heightened grade of  participation in God, as we 
come to be aware and experience his essential freedom. This, 
happens insofar as, while God is silently present in mytholo-
gy, he is not acknowledged as an active source of  our religious 
representations. Mythology is a process through which human 
consciousness cures its post-Edenic wounds in a process dictated 
by natural necessity. This, does not mean that God is not pres-
ent in this process as he inhabits the whole of  creation: rath-
er, this means that his presence is not recognized as such82. By 
contrast, Christianity is grounded in revelation as the explicit 
act in history of  a non-human free consciousness, something 
that by its very existence reveals an aspect of  God the myth-
ological consciousness was not aware of, namely his ability of  
acting freely and outside natural necessity83. In Christianity, our 
participation in God is increased as a new relationship between 
he and humanity is established. In this we stand ‹‹face to face››, 
and we come to know him in his freedom, as well as ourselves 
81 clayTon, The Problem of  God, 480.
82 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 883. 
83 Ivi, 883. 
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as his images84. Hence, we could say that symbols are the results 
of  a symbiosis of  two organisms, where the symbols develop 
the stronger this symbiotic relationship is. This also makes pos-
sible for religious representations to die as their age comes to 
pass and they are superseded by more realized representations. 
This happens, as over the course of  the theogonical process our 
awareness of  God’s nature and his connection to the world in-
creases, and thus we come to imagine him in different ways. 
Consequently, older symbols die as they do not play an active 
role anymore in our putting into image the divine.
In Schelling’s view, the main feature of  our religious sym-
bols is that of  allowing us to meet the divine in and through 
them. In this respect, Schelling thinks of  a symbol as having 
what we could call an iconic character, meaning the feature of  
expressing and partaking of  an ontologically higher reality85, 
which in this case is the divine. Symbols definitely presuppose 
a metaphysics grounded in the concept of  participation, inso-
far as they partake of  the higher realities they manifest, sharing 
something of  the divine albeit in a reduced intensity86. Thus, 
although God becomes manifest through these finite vessels 
which symbolize him with their existence, symbols are partial 
to the extent that they do not exhaust completely the reality to 
which they make reference. 
Hence, symbols are the expressions of  the symbiotic re-
lationship between God and humanity. As our awareness of  
this relationship shapes our understanding of  the whole of  our 
existence, symbols are what our imagination produces when it 
strives to give us an image of  the whole87, in its effort to put into 
84 Ivi, 921-925. 
85 D. hedley, The Iconic Imagination, XVII.
86 Ivi, 145.
87 Ivi, 45.
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an image God, creation, and humanity as in communion with 
one another. Furthermore, as we produce symbols out of  our 
forces as much as they come to us thanks to divine impulses, 
symbols are our creations, but at the same time they are as it 
were given to us.  Hence, they are positioned simultaneously in 
the immanent and in the transcendent sphere. This allows them 
to be a key to understand our nature, as well as that of  God and 
our connection to him88. 
According to Janet Martin Soskice, insofar as symbols are 
employed as references to something else, they elicit the use of  
metaphoric language89. By this, she means a kind of  language 
which talks about something by employing terms suggestive of  
another reality90. In this regard, we can recall Rowan Williams’ 
distinction between speaking in a representative or metaphoric 
way and speaking in a descriptive way. While in the second case 
we speak in order to imitate features of  the world, in the first 
case, by contrast, we are concerned with incorporating, trans-
lating, expanding, and giving shape to what we perceive91. Cru-
cially, the latter is in general the kind of  linguistic activity that 
Schelling is entertaining as he gives an account of  the Christian 
dogmas and of  religious representations in general. 
As an example, we can think of  Schelling describing the 
figure of  Nemesis. In this respect, Nemesis is ‹‹the force angry at 
who enjoys good luck without any merit of  his own››, and also 
‹‹the supreme law, which opposes what is ambiguous, and thus 
generally speaking the accidental››92. As we can see, of  the two 
88 Ivi, 147-148.
89 J. M. SoSkice, Metaphor and Religious Language, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1985, 54-5.
90 Ivi, 15.
91 R. WilliamS, The Edge of  Words: God and the Habits of  Language, Bloomsbury, 
London 2014, 22-24.
92 Schelling, Filosofia della Mitologia, 13-14.
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descriptions, the first adheres more to the mythological account 
of  Nemesis than the second. However, they do not exclude 
one another, as Schelling puts these two reflections literally in 
the same page. Even the first description gives an account of  
Nemesis in terms of  a force, hence presenting a tendency to 
transcend the boundaries of  the mythological figure itself. This, 
is an instance of  the usage of  language that Soskice suggests 
symbols elicit. Force is a term which here makes reference to 
its embodiment, Nemesis, but that at the same time suggests 
another reality, present in the figure of  Nemesis but in a sense 
going beyond it. In this, just like in the case of  the Trinity, we 
see how Schelling employs the Greek deity and the sort of  lan-
guage she elicits, in order to address elements of  reality which 
are expressed in the symbol but are in a sense different from the 
symbol as they are not exhausted by it. Then, we can think of  
God as one, and represent him as the Holy Trinity. In this, we 
shall find two symbols representing him, which at the same time 
make metaphorical reference to and thus give us insight into the 
unfathomable unity which constitute the three potencies.
As regards what I mean by metaphor, I want to stress how 
I am employing this concept borrowing on Soskice’s claim that 
we should understand metaphors just as a way of  using our lan-
guage93. Therefore, models, allegories, symbols, may elicit or 
connect to metaphoric language, but are different from meta-
phors as they have a non-linguistic nature94. This is important, 
as often metaphor is simply a synonym for allegory. This, is ex-
actly what Schelling thinks symbols are not, as allegories are 
always to be understood as posing for something else which is 
their true meaning, according to a one-to-one relationship95. As 
93 SoSkice, Metaphor and Religious Language, 15.
94 Ivi, 54-55.
95 hedley, Living Forms of  the Imagination, 134-135.
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a matter of  fact, to understand metaphors as allegories other-
wise named, is also akin to a view that Soskice disagrees with 
and understands as opposing her reading of  the concept of  
metaphor. She calls this the substitution theory of  metaphor, 
namely an account of  metaphors as the replacement for some-
thing else96.  
Hence, by linking Schelling’s reading of  symbols to Sos-
kice’s understanding of  metaphors, I am not denying what he 
calls their tautegorical as opposed to allegorical character. By 
this term, Schelling means that symbols signify nothing but 
themselves97, and thus, as opposed to Euhemeristic interpreta-
tions, must not be understood as imaginary portraits of  histor-
ical or natural events98. Instead, symbols and therefore myth-
ological representations ought to be understood in terms of  
their relationship with the higher dimension which gives life to 
them99. Symbols signify themselves as, as much as they do not 
exhaust what they embody, symbols signify themselves as they 
are the living manifestations of  the divine, present to us thanks 
and through them. As Schelling says in his account of  the god-
dess Persephone, ‹‹she does not just mean, but is that principle 
that we see in her, [she is] an essence existing in actuality: this is 
valid as well for all other [mythological] deities››100. 
Metaphors generated by our religious symbols do not sim-
ply allow us to form a linguistic connection between them and 
God. As Jerry Day puts it, symbols are primordial forces con-
nected to what remains unarticulated beyond our thought and 
language101. By ‹‹suggesting›› the divine reality they give us a 
96 SoSkice, Metaphor and Religious Language, 8-14.
97 hedley, Living Forms of  the Imagination, 117
98 Ivi, 122-123.
99 Ivi, 123-124.
100 Schelling, Filosofia della Rivelazione, 831.
101 day, Voegelin, Schelling, 73. 
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perspective on it, and new metaphors bring new ways of  speak-
ing and relating ourselves to God102, hence further articulating 
this ground of  which Day writes about. Accordingly, symbols are 
that which originates what Hans Blumenberg calls fundamental 
metaphors103. These, are representations of  the unfathomable 
totality, something in virtue of  which an entire conception of  
the reality, both divine and human is born. These fundamental 
metaphors are also then the basis from which we derive our 
conduct and way of  looking at the world104. 
As Markus Gabriel rightly argues while addressing Schell-
ing, our existence is inescapably made up of  symbols presenting 
the unconditioned in a conditioned way, and we live and act ac-
cording to our way of  perceiving and furthering this process of  
presenting the Absolute105. It follows that further development 
of  our symbols and the metaphors they generate also broad-
ens our conceptual array and our spirituality106. In other words, 
by imagining new symbols and metaphors, and by exploring 
and deepening the nature of  those in which we are already em-
bedded, we strengthen our communion with the realities such 
symbols embody107. Each time we refine our understanding of  
our religious representations, we change their influence on the 
development of  our future interpretations of  the divine, as well 
as our bond with God in general. 
102 SoSkice, Metaphor and Religious Language, 57-58.
103 In this context we should speak of  them as fundamental symbols, as Blu-
menberg seems to understand metaphors the way Schelling understand sym-
bols.
104 H. BlumenBerg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, Cornel University Press,  Ita-
cha 2010, 14.
105 G. Markus – S. zizek, Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German 
Idealism, Continuum, London 2009, 75.
106 SoSkice, Metaphor and Religious Language, 62.
107 WilliamS, The Edge of  Words, 69.
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6. The Way Back
As I have explored Schelling’s understanding of  religious repre-
sentations, in this section I shall give an account of  how these re-
late to what Schelling calls the theogonical process. As discussed 
in the first chapter, our post-Fall condition opens the necessity 
of  a historical process ending with our full awareness of  God’s 
nature. Furthermore, this process reflects the accomplishment 
of  God’s plan for creation. In this respect, mythology and its 
culmination in revelation manifest the broader pattern of  rec-
onciliation of  the whole of  creation in God108, and Schelling 
himself  claims that mythology as a transition is fundamental in 
relationship to ‹‹the universal plan of  Providence››109. Hence, 
the process advances with the enrichment of  our religious rep-
resentations from the mythological to the revealed ones. There-
fore, it is possible to speak of  our religious images in terms of  
them being closer than others to manifest God properly110. 
Accordingly to the providential nature of  the theogoni-
cal process, the development from one step of  the process to 
another is not dictated by randomness, and even less it is the 
passage from mythology to revealed religion. Once more, let 
us borrow on Rowan Williams’ words, as he rightly claims that 
the world always comes to us in symbols, and all we can do in 
order to understand it, it is as something of  which we have to 
speak further111. Our speaking further dictates the development 
of  our symbols and the metaphoric language attached to them 
according to the previous conditions in which we found our-
selves. The workings of  the three potencies give us direction, 
108 Wilson, Schellings Mythologie, 51.
109 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 117-118.
110 duprè, The Role of  Mythology in Schelling’s Late Philosophy, 5.
111 WilliamS, The Edge of  Words, 69.
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and this according to God’s providence as Schelling sees it at 
work in the history of  humanity. Therefore, the development 
of  our religious representations in mythology follows a route, 
which is set to flow into and cease with revelation. In order to 
characterize the stages of  the theogonical process, I wish to bor-
row again upon Markus Gabriel’s reading of  Schelling, and in 
particular on his distinction between objectification and reifi-
cation. In this regard, to objectify the Absolute is to make it 
manifest while preserving its elusiveness. In turn, to reify the 
Absolute is to present it in a supposedly transparent way, as if  it 
was something standing on its own, independent of  our activi-
ties. Thus, a reified presentation of  the absolute is false insofar 
as it is blind to the Absolute’s inexhaustibility112, seeking to erase 
that space of  metaphoric and evocative language which exists 
between the symbol and its origin. 
Crucially, for an image to be an objectification or a reifi-
cation is not to possess some sort of  timeless property. Rather, 
an image can run out of  its vitality, and stop being an objectifi-
cation. In fact, Schelling sees the whole of  mythology as a rei-
fication when compared to revealed religion, although it made 
room for objectifications of  the Absolute before the coming of  
Christianity. Moreover, we can locate the same kind of  dynam-
ics inside mythology itself. This is evident from the very begin-
ning of  Schelling’s lectures, with his description of  the peripher-
alisation of  the first mythological deities with the coming of  the 
next wave of  gods, namely the following step of  the theogonical 
process113. 
As already mentioned, the theogonical process happens 
through a mixture of  necessity and arbitrariness. On one level, 
each unfolding of  God’s life is grounded in and shaped by the 
112 markuS - zizek, Mythology, Madness and Laughter, 76.
113 Schelling, Filosofia della Mitologia, 48-49.
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potencies, but on another level, each of  these passages is instan-
tiated through personal inspiration and other human factors. As 
a result, although sometimes we even have different interpreta-
tions of  the same myth, according to Schelling we can still find 
a ‹‹necessary relationship in consciousness (indipendent of  the 
arbitrariness of  personal representations)›› across the different 
versions114. This necessary relationship is a manifestation of  the 
potencies as they are the source of  all logic and metaphysics. 
Therefore, it is also a manifestation of  God’s presence in our 
religious representations through the potencies. Subsequently, 
by discerning this presence we come to know the potencies and 
thus we come to know God’s nature better as we see it instantiat-
ed in our religious representations, thus making theogony prog-
ress. According to Schelling this mostly means that we come to 
an ever greater awareness of  God’s spirituality, as we go deeper 
into the nature of  the potencies and realize their identity115. 
Schelling finds Greek mythology to be the highest point of  
mythology as it is able of  expressing all three potencies with a 
degree of  spirituality that we find nowhere else in the pagan 
world116. The Hellenic represented the three potencies as the 
three different forms that the god Dionysus assumes117. How-
ever, although Greek mythology acknowledges that the three 
potencies are one, it still fails to see the oneness underlying the 
different images of  God, and how the potencies can be one 
without their differences ceasing to be. The three forms of  Di-
onysus are separated from one another, and do not enjoy the 
same degree of  oneness which binds the three persons of  the 
Trinity. Thus, only by revelation we finally come to an under-
114 Ivi, 181.
115 WilSon, Nietzsche und Schelling, 85.
116 duprè, The Role of  Mythology in Schelling’s Late Philosophy, 3.
117 WilSon, Schellings Mythologie, 16.
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standing of  God’s oneness which represent the potencies in an 
organic oneness118.
At this point we have to resist the temptation of  falling back 
in a framework/content dichotomy. In the light of  the partic-
ipatory stance I introduced above and to which I ascribe, we 
must not think of  our images of  God as more or less precise 
conceptual structure that we apply to a transcendent object. 
Once more, Persephone is the principle, the necessary relation-
ship that we see in her through our consciousness. Accordingly, 
the Trinity is not the perfect representation of  God because of  
its exceptional descriptive accuracy. The three potencies and the 
laws we find in them are not something to be described, but 
drives according to which living beings develop. In other words, 
in Schelling’s perspective the Trinity is the most sublime symbol 
of  God as it is able to fully embody the nature and power of  
God’s life, rather than being something we superimpose to some 
sort of  pre-existing pattern.
In Schelling’s words, the images introduced by revealed re-
ligion are ‹‹images of  the supreme unity which is the archetype 
of  everything concrete there is››, and, as they bring together the 
three potencies in their oneness, ‹‹they shall be perfect, realized 
in themselves››119. In light of  this, mythologies are the scenery 
of  struggle as the human spirit is pushed onto the next step of  
the theogonic process. By contrast, there is no continuation of  
the theogonical process after Christianity as its images are per-
fect and realized. Rather, a different sort of  process takes place 
in revealed religion, namely that involving the development of  
the implications of  its symbols and thus the augmentation of  
its tradition. As he puts it, even with the advent of  revelation 
118 duprè, The Role of  Mythology in Schelling’s late Mythology, 5.
119 Schelling, Il Monoteismo, 110
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Satan is defeated but not destroyed120. In other words, revelation 
does not remove completely the danger of  reification, namely 
that of  symbols losing their capacity of  communicating God, as 
they can cease to resonate with the human spirit. Even if  now 
the symbols provided by the revealed religion are complete, the 
possibility of  re-enacting the fallen condition switches from the 
images of  God to humanity’s spiritual reality121. 
Borrowing upon Raimon Panikkar, we might say that no 
religion reflects human perfection - in Schelling’s terms, not 
even revealed religion does. However, the latter is the integral 
way toward humanity’s flourishing in God122. In mythology, we 
ought to understand the different steps of  the theogonical pro-
cess in the light of  the increasing truth of  the symbols of  God. 
In revealed religion, the concern is not so much around our 
images of  God as in a sense they cannot be improved. Rather, 
we must care about how much these images are interiorized. 
In mythology the images of  the divine become more and more 
spiritual as we better imagine God, whereas in revealed religion 
to do the same does not bring new images but rather deepen our 
relationship with them.  In other words, Christians do not ever 
get to move past the image of  God as the Holy Trinity, but can 
develop an ever better communion with the transcendent by 
deepening their understanding of  this symbol of  the divine. In 
other words, they can always re-imagine the Trinity, this way de-
veloping the metaphorical bridge between the symbol and God 
and renewing the life of  their relationship with God.
120 WilSon, Schellings Mythologie, 87.
121 Ivi, 88-89.
122 R. panikkar, Religione e Religioni, Morcelliana, Brescia 1964, 123.
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Conclusion
I now wish to sum up the results of  this brief  analysis. As I ar-
gued in the introduction, the concept of  monotheism appears to 
be the core of  Schelling’s series of  lectures in Berlin. This follows 
for two reasons. First, the reading developed by Schelling lets us 
understand all of  our religious representations as embodying 
the same divine reality, while at the same time allowing preserv-
ing the uniqueness of  this reality. This, provides Schelling with 
the possibility of  producing an history of  religion as the progres-
sive augmentation of  our awareness of  the true nature of  the 
divine dimension, as well as the deepening of  our participation 
of  it. Subsequently, he is able to treat all of  humanity’s religious 
expressions as parts and successive steps of  the same process.
Secondly, the necessary connection between monotheism 
and the doctrine of  the potencies, that is, the one between Trin-
itarianism and divine uniqueness as seen from a philosophical 
perspective, produces in Schelling’s account the yardstick to 
measure the degree of  participation of  the divine that a particu-
lar religious symbol represents. Understanding the Holy Trinity 
as the most perfect among the possible symbolizations of  the 
divine, other religious representations are placed on a scale ac-
cording to the degree they resemble the Trinity. In other words, 
monotheism in its connection to the doctrine of  the potencies 
gives to Schelling the means necessary to develop his philosoph-
ical analysis of  what he calls the theogonical process.
As a conclusion, I hold that the concept of  monotheism is 
the key to the understanding of  the project Schelling is develop-
ing in his Berlin lectures. Not only the work Schelling does in the 
first six lectures in the series on the philosophy of  mythology sets 
the background for everything that follows, but it also provides 
the necessary cross-reference for the rest of  the discussion, as to 
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truly know God according to Trinitarian monotheism becomes 
the goal of  religious and therefore human history.
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